



Australian Information Security Evaluation Program

Certification Report

Juniper Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M,
EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP,
EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F,
EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM

Version 1.0, 12 April 2024

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(Certification expires five years from certification report date)

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Executive summary

This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper Networks Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM against approved Protection Profiles (PPs).

This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PPs [4]:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP)
- Network Device collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP) Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.2, 10 May 2016 (MACSECEP)

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 15 March 2024.

With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that administrators:

- ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are understood
- configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor's product administrator guidance and pay attention to all security warnings
- maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is preserved
- verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the Juniper website
- have a system auditor review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.

Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.

This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information regarding the conduct of the evaluation.

It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target and read this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.

Introduction

Overview

This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE).

Purpose

The purpose of this Certification Report is to:

- report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the Common Criteria and Protection Profiles [4]
- provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.

This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE's Security Target [7] which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.

Identification

The TOE is Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM

Description	Version
Evaluation scheme	Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE	Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM
Software version	22.3R1
Hardware platform	ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM
Security Target	Security Target Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM Version 1.0, 29 February 2024
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, dated 15 March 2024 Document reference EFT-T032-ETR 1.0
Criteria	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version 3.1 Rev 5

Conformance Network Device collaborative Protection Profile version 2.2e,
23 March 2020 (NDcPP)
Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.2,
10 May 2016 (MACSECEP)

Developer Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale
California 94089 United States of America

Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Unit 3, 10 Geils Court
Deakin ACT 2600
Australia

Target of Evaluation

Overview

This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.

Description of the TOE

The TOE is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM Ethernet Switches with MACsec. Each TOE model is a specific network appliance implementing the same functionality on a different hardware platform.

The variants of the TOE share a common architecture and feature set. They implement a variety of high-speed interfaces (only Ethernet is in the scope of the evaluation) for enterprise branch, campus, and data center networks. They also share common Junos firmware, features, and technology for compatibility across platforms.

The appliance variations constituting the TOE are secure network devices that protect themselves largely by offering only a minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. They include the Junos OS firmware, Junos OS 22.3R1, which is a special purpose OS offering no general-purpose computing capabilities. Junos OS implements both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.

The appliances primary function is to support the definition and enforcement of information flow policies among network nodes. Each information flow from one network node to another passes through an instance of the TOE. Information flow is controlled on the basis of network node addresses and protocol. The TOE also ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and implements the necessary tools to manage all security function.

The TOE implements MACsec between adjacent devices. All traffic communicated between the devices including frames for LLDP, DHCP, ARP, STP, Ethernet Control frames, etc (the exceptions to this protection are Destination MAC and Source MAC addresses in MACsec and MKA frames).

TOE Functionality

The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.6 of the Security Target [7].


TOE physical boundary

The TOE is an appliance consisting of the Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-YM appliance chassis. Hence, the TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis, as shown below. The physical boundary of the TOE is the entire chassis of the appliance.

The install image provided for the TOE is:

- For ACX5448-M: junos-vmhost-install-acx-x86-64-22.3R1.11.tgz
- For the EX4400 variants: junos-install-ex-x86-64-22.3R1.11.tgz
- For QFX5120-48YM: jinstall-host9-qfx-5e-ng-x86-64-22.3R1.11-secure-signed.tgz

The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the “show version” command is executed on the device.



The TOE interfaces comprise the following:

- The TOE interfaces are comprised of the network interfaces which pass traffic
- management interface, which handles administrative actions.

Architecture

The TOE consists of the following major architectural components.

Switch fabric – the switch fabric boards/modules provide a highly scalable, non-blocking, centralized switch fabric matrix through which all network data passes.

Routing Engine – the Routine Engine (RE) runs the Junos firmware and implements Layer 3 routing services and Layer 2 switching services. The RE also implements the management functions for configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the flow of information through the TOE, including support for appliance interface control and control plane functions such as chassis component, system management and user access to the appliance.

Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) – The PFE implements all operations necessary for transit packet forwarding. The PFE implements an extensive set of Layer 2 and Layer 3 services that can be deployed in any combination of Layer 2 and Layer 3 applications.

Power – The ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48F, and QFX5120-48YM variants of the TOE include non-PoE ports. The EX4400-24P and EX4400-48P variants implement a Power over Ethernet (PoE) interface for powering up the TOE. The EX4400-24MP and EX4400-48MP variants support both options. Power supply bays allow flexibility for provisioning and redundancy. The power supplies connect to the midplane, which distributes the different output voltages produced by the power supplies to the appliance components, depending on their voltage requirements.

The RE and the PFE function independently while constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This enables streamlined forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds.

Juniper's Virtual Chassis technology allows multiple interconnected switches to operate as a single, logical unit, enabling users to manage all platforms as one virtual device. The functions of the appliances can all be managed through the Junos firmware, either from a connected terminal console or via a network connection. Network management is secured using the SSH protocol. All management, whether from a user connecting to a terminal or from the network, requires successful

authentication. In the evaluated deployment the TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a directly connected console or over the network secured using the SSH protocol

MACsec can be deployed in point-to-point mode or shared mode with multiple stations. In the evaluated configuration MACsec must be configured individually on each point-to-point Ethernet link, such that a pair of MACsec devices (connected by a physical medium) protect Ethernet frames switched or routed from one device to the other. The two MACsec devices are provided with a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and utilize the MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol to create a secure tunnel. MKA is used by the two MACsec devices to agree upon MACsec keys. MACsec must be configured to protect all traffic between the devices, with the exception of the MKA or Ethernet control traffic such as EAP over LAN (EAPOL) frames. The devices will first exchange MKA frames, which serve to determine the peer is an authorized peer, and agree upon a shared key and MACsec cipher suite used to set up a transmit Security Association (SA) and a receive SA. Once the SAs are set up, MACsec-protected frames traverse the unprotected link.

Clarification of scope

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies. The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [7].

Evaluated functionality

Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles and Supporting Document and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined for ease of execution.

Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

The TOE relies on the provision of the following items in the network environment:

- Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs
- SSHv2 client for remote administration
- Serial connection client for local administration

Non-evaluated functionality and services

Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services outside of the evaluated configuration.

Australian Government users should refer to the *Australian Government Information Security Manual* [5] for policy relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.

The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:

- use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of File Transfer Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of Secure Sockets Layer, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of Command Line Interface account super-user and linux root account.

Security

The CCRA Security Function Policy is a set of rules that defines how information within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [7] contains a summary of the functionality that is evaluated.

Usage

Evaluated configuration

The evaluated configuration is based on the default installation of the TOE with additional configuration implemented from specific guidance instructions. The Common Criteria guidance documents for this evaluation are [6]:

Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4650-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, and QFX5120-48YM Devices Published 2023-02-23, Release 22.3R1;

Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for ACX5448 Devices, Published 2023-02-28, Release 22.3R1;

Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4400-24MP, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24T, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP, EX4400-48P, and EX4400-48T Devices, Published 2023-02-23, Release 22.3R1.

Secure delivery

There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the integrity of the platform:

- shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well as the device
- outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device
- inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the seal remains intact.

If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.

Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:

- verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without a purchase order
- when a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information:
 - purchase order number
 - Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
 - carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
 - list of items shipped including serial numbers

- address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
- verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
 - compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received
 - log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at <https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management> to view the order status
 - compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.

Installation of the TOE

The configuration guides [6] contain all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.

Version verification

The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from the <https://www.juniper.net> support pages. In addition to the automated verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. The administrator should verify the hash of the software before installing it into the hardware platform.

Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command 'show version'.

Documentation and guidance

It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. The evaluated configuration guide (system admin guide) documents for the ACX5448-M device, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP devices and QFX5120-48YM device running Junos OS 22.3R1 are available for download at <https://www.juniper.net/documentation>. The documents are [6]:

Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4650-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, and QFX5120-48YM Devices Published 2023-02-23, Release 22.3R1

Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for ACX5448 Devices, Published 2023-02-28, Release 22.3R1

Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4400-24MP, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24T, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP, EX4400-48P, and EX4400-48T Devices, Published 2023-02-23, Release 22.3R1.

Common Criteria material is available at <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The *Australian Government Information Security Manual* is available at <https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism> [5].

Secure usage

The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.

The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains.

The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

The administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organisation. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known security vulnerabilities.

The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

The administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorised access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

This assumption is only applicable to interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Network Device collaborative Protection Profile. For these interfaces, the TOE does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it.

Evaluation

Overview

This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as part of the evaluation and the certification result.

Evaluation procedures

The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection Profiles [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1, 2].

Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [3] and the relevant Supporting Documents [12].

The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security Evaluation Program [10].

In addition, the conditions outlined in the *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security* [9] and the document *CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs* [13] were also upheld.

Functional testing

All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Supporting Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed by the TOE.

Entropy testing

The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate report [11].

Penetration testing

The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and Network Device collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP) Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption Supporting Documents [12] which follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been considered:

- public vulnerabilities
- ND iTC (Network Device international Technical Community) sourced
- evaluation team generated
- tool generated.

Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a basic attack potential.

Certification

Overview

This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and recommendations made by the certifiers.

Assurance

This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the technology area of network devices. Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.

The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the Protection Profile Supporting Documents and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential. Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.

The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs). PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of the architecture of the TOE.

Certification result

Teron Labs **has determined** that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [7] and **has met** the requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (CPP_ND) and Network Device collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP) Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption (MACSECEP) [4].

After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical Report [8], the Australian Certification Authority **certifies** the evaluation of Juniper Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM devices performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.

Recommendations

Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].

In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:

- ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are understood
- configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor's product administrator guidance and pay attention to all security warnings

- maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is preserved
- verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the <https://www.juniper.net> website
- have a system auditor review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.

Annex A – References and abbreviations

References

1. *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5*
2. *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5*
3. *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5*
4. Protection Profiles:
 - a) *collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP)*
 - b) *Network Device collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP) Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption (MACSECEP), Version 1.2, 10 May 2016*
5. *Australian Government Information Security Manual: <https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism>*
6. Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guides:
 - a) *Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4650-48Y, QFX5120-32C, QFX5120-48T, QFX5120-48Y, and QFX5120-48YM Devices Published 2023-02-23, Release 22.3R1;*
 - b) *Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for ACX5448 Devices, Published 2023-02-28, Release 22.3R1;*
 - c) *Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4400-24MP, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24T, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP, EX4400-48P, and EX4400-48T Devices, Published 2023-02-23, Release 22.3R1*
7. *Security Target Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM, Version 1.0, 29 February 2024*
8. *Evaluation Technical Report - Junos OS 22.3R1 for ACX5448-M, EX4400-24T, EX4400-24P, EX4400-24MP, EX4400-48T, EX4400-48P, EX4400-48F, EX4400-48MP and QFX5120-48YM, dated 15 March 2024 (Document reference EFT-T032-ETR 1.0)*
9. *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security, 2 July 2014*
10. *AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf*
11. Entropy Reports:
 - a) *Junos OS Entropy Source version 22.3 Entropy Assessment and SP 800-90B Compliance Report, Version 1.5, 30 August 2023, EX4400 (Intel®Atom™ CPU C3558R), QFX5120-48YM (Intel Xeon D-1627), ACX5448 (Intel Xeon D1528)*
 - b) *Junos OS Entropy Source Entropy Assessment and SP 800-90B Compliance Report, Version 1.0, 25 January 2023*
12. Supporting Documents:
 - a) *Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2, December-2019 (CPP_ND_SD)*

13. *CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version 2.0 CCDB-013-v2.0*

Abbreviations

AISEP	Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ARP	Address Resolution Protocol
ASD	Australian Signals Directorate
CAK	Connectivity Association Key
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CLI	Command Line Interface
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
EAPOL	Extensible Authentication Protocol Over Local Area Network
LAN	Local Area Network
LLDP	Link Layer Discovery Protocol
MACsec	Media Access Control Security
MKA	MACsec Key Agreement
NDcPP	CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
ND ITC	Network Device international Technical Community
PFE	Packet Forwarding Engine
PHY	Physical Layer
PP	Protection Profile
RE	Routing Engine
SSH	Secure Shell
STP	Spanning Tree Protocol
TOE	Target of Evaluation